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DEFENSE AGAINST THE DARK ARTS:
JUSTICE JACKSON, JUSTICE KENNEDYAND THE
NO-COMPELLED-SPEECH DOCTRINE
Richard F Duncan*
"The one thing that doesn't abide by majority rule is a
person's conscience." -Atticus Finch1
"Your statute cannot condemn me to death for such silence,
for neither your statute nor any laws in the world punish people
except for words or deeds, surely not for keeping silence." -Sir
2
Thomas More
"The possibility of enforcing not only complete obedience to
the will of the State, but complete uniformity of opinion on all
s
subjects, now existed for the first time." -George Orwell
INTRODUCTION

According to Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, "The right to think is the
beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government
because speech is the beginning of thought." 4 If this is so, and I believe it
is, then the greatest threat to freedom, the darkest of the dark arts of
government, occurs when the law compels persons to speak and thus
commandeers their intellectual autonomy. 5 Only a vibrant First
6
Amendment is an adequate defense against this darkest of the dark arts.
Sherman S. Welpton, Jr. Professor of Law and Warren R. Wise Professor of Law,
University of Nebraska College of Law.
1 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 120 (HarperCollins, 1st Perennial Classics
ed. 2002) (1960).
2
CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS, ST. THOMAS MORE 228 (Burns & Oates, rev. ed. 1961)
(1934).
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 206 (Penguin Group 1977) (1949). "Nothing was your own
except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull." Id. at 27.
4
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
5
As expressed by Justice Kennedy, "governments are most dangerous when they try
to tell people what to think." HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM 87 (updated
ed. 2019).
In the magical world of Harry Potter, "Defense Against the Dark Arts" is the class
taught at Hogwarts to teach students how to defend themselves against the dark forces. J.K.
ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE

66-67 (First Am. ed., Arthur A. Levine

Books 1998) (1997). Harry's first Defense Against the Dark Arts teacher was Professor
Quirrell and his first Dark Arts textbook was Dark Forces: A Guide to Self-Protection by
Quentin Trimble. Id. at 67, 70.
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This Article traces the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence protecting speaker autonomy and the "right not to speak"
from its origins in the flag salute cases to the present. In particular, I focus
on two magnificent judicial opinions defending this fundamental free
speech right, the majority opinion of Justice Jackson in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette7 and the concurring opinion of
Justice Kennedy in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra (NIFLA).8 These two eloquent and powerful opinions are true
landmarks of liberty and strong shields against an authoritarian
government's tyrannical attempts to coerce ideological orthodoxy by
compelling individuals to say things they wish not to say. In Justice
Kennedy's case, his concurring opinion in NIFLA was issued near the end
of his final term on the Supreme Court, and thus it represents an
exclamation point on his wonderful legacy of protecting freedom of
thought and freedom of speech.9 Although these opinions are separated by
seventy-five years, they share a common understanding of the importance
of the First Amendment for the protection of intellectual autonomy from
authoritarian officials and compelled ideological conformity.
I.

THE FLAG SALUTE CASES:

JUSTICE JACKSON'S ELOQUENT RESPONSE TO JUSTICE FRANKFURTER

A. Justice Frankfurterand the FirstFlag Salute Case
In 1898, New York became the first state to enact a mandatory flag
salute law. 10 However, the flag salute movement soon took off like a
rocket's red glare, led by a diverse assortment of groups, including the
Daughters of the American Revolution, the Ku Klux Klan, and the

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9
David French, In Defense of Free Speech, Justice Thomas Wielded the Scalpel, but
Justice Kennedy Brought the Hammer, NAT'L REV. (June 26, 2018), https://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/in-defense-of-free-speech-justice-thomas-wielded-the-scalpel-but
-justice-kennedy-brought-the-hammer/ ("Justice Kennedy's concurrence ... was a short but
astonishing opinion, one that-along with his opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop-suggests
that his judicial legacy will now include two of the more powerful court statements for people
of faith in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.").
10 Winston Bowman, The Flag Salute Cases, 2017 FED. JUD. CTR. 2.
7
8
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American Legion. By 1943, when Barnette was decided, all forty-eight
states had adopted some version of compulsory flag salute. 12
Onto this field strode the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious
denomination that took very seriously the Biblical command in Exodus
20:3-5 about not bowing down before any "graven image."1 3 Indeed, as
Winston Bowman noted, in Nazi Germany "Jehovah's Witnesses had
refused to engage in the Nazi salute on the grounds that it reflected a form
of worship for a secular power." 14 As a result, "they suffered atrocious
persecution" under the Nazi regime and thousands died in concentration
camps for the crime of following their religious consciences. 15
In America, although Jehovah's Witnesses were not executed or
placed in concentration camps, they did experience a level of persecution
when they enrolled their children in public schools. 16 The two landmark
Supreme Court cases, Minersuille School District v. Gobitis17 and
Barnette,18 each involved schoolchildren-19 -William and Lillian Gobitas in

11 Id. The Daughters of the American Revolution and the Ku Klux Klan supported
the movement in order to "encourage patriotism as a bulwark against communism." Id. The
American Legion, on the other hand, made mandatory flag salutes its "signal issue," all in
the cause of advancing its goal of "one hundred percent Americanism." Id.
12 Bowman, supra note 10, at 2. Even in jurisdictions without a flag salute law, many
"schools and teachers often required students to participate in such a ritual as a matter of
course." Id.
13 Id. at 4. See Exodus 20:3-5 (King James Version), for a provision of the full text of
the pertinent Biblical command:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any
graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in
the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow
down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God,
visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth
generation of them that hate me ....
14 Bowman, supra note 10, at 2-3.
15 Id. at 3.
16 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943) ("Children of
this faith have been expelled from school and are threatened with exclusion for no other
cause. Officials threaten to send them to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined
juveniles."). In fact, "[a]ttempts have been made in many states to repress or regulate
[Jehovah's Witnesses] by legislation," but Jehovah's Witnesses have "uniformly resisted"
such oppression. Edward F. Waite, The Debt of ConstitutionalLaw to Jehovah's Witnesses,
28 MINN. L. REV. 209, 223 (1944). Robert Ferguson marked this resistance when he observed
that, in the period between 1938 and 1944 alone, Jehovah's Witnesses were parties in
thirty-one cases. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L.,
& HUMAN. 201, 203 (1990). Those cases resulted in "sixteen civil liberties opinions from the
Supreme Court." Id.
17 310U.S. 586 (1940).
18 319 U.S. at 624.
19 In both Gobitis and Barnette,the case captions misspelled the family names of the
parties. Bowman, supra note 10, at 19. In the former, the family name is Gobitas with an "a"
not an "i," and in the latter, it is Barnett without an "e"at the end. Id.
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Gobitis, and Gathie and Marie Barnett in Barnette-who were Jehovah's
20
Witnesses disciplined for refusing to salute the flag.
In Gobitis, the children "were expelled from the public schools of
Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part
of a daily school exercise." 21 As a result of their expulsion, the Gobitas
children were deprived of a free public education and their parents were
required to bear the financial burden of paying for a private school
education. 22 Because the Gobitas family believed, in accordance with their
Jehovah's Witness faith, that they were forbidden by Biblical commands
from bowing down before graven images, such as the flag,2 3 the family
"sought to enjoin the authorities from continuing to exact participation
in the flag-salute ceremony as a condition of ... attendance at the
Minersville school. " 24 Since Gobitis was decided in the early days of
incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court described their claim as asking it to
determine whether their free exercise of religion was protected in this case
25
by "the Fourteenth [Amendment] through its absorption of the First."
Thus, the question presented in Gobitis was not whether a compelled
affirmation of belief violated the Free Speech Clause and the rights of all
dissenters to refuse to participate, but rather whether the Gobitas
children were entitled to a religious liberty exemption from the pledge
requirement under the Free Exercise Clause (as "absorbed" by the
26
Fourteenth Amendment).
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in an eight to one
decision, viewed the case as one in which a person's "religious duty [comes]
into conflict with the secular interests of his fellow-men." 27 Thus, the issue
before the Court was this: "When does the constitutional guarantee
compel exemption from doing what society thinks necessary for the
promotion of some great common end, or from a penalty for conduct which
' 28
appears dangerous to the general good?"

20 See
id. at 4-5, 19 (discussing the Gobitas and Barnett children's
punishment-expulsion and daily suspension, respectively-for refusing to salute the flag).
21 310 U.S. at 591. The flag salute ceremony required the placing of the right hand
on the breast and reciting the pledge in unison: "I pledge allegiance to my flag, and to the
Republic for which it stands; one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Id.
Finally, "[w]hile the words are spoken, teachers and pupils extend their right hands in salute
to the flag." Id.
22 Id. at 592.
23 Id.; see also id. at 592 n.1 (explaining that Jehovah Witnesses rely on Exodus
20:3-5 to explain why they refuse to salute the flag).
24 Id. at 592.
25 Id. at 593.
26
27
28

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Because the case before the Gobitis Court involved the curriculum of
a public school, the power of the government to "train[] children in
patriotic impulses by these compulsions" was at its zenith. 29 As Justice
Frankfurter put it so clearly, "the courtroom is not the arena for debating
issues of educational policy," the Supreme Court is not "the school board
for the country" and, as such, "[t]hat authority has not been given to this
Court, nor should we assume it."30
The Court held that the mandatory pledge requirement did not
violate the free exercise rights of religious dissenters. 31 Although the
"[g]overnment may not interfere with organized or individual expression
of belief or disbelief," the Constitution does not "compel exemption from
doing what society thinks necessary for the promotion of some great
common end." 32 In other words, although the right to believe that bowing
down before graven images violates the commands of God is protected by
the Constitution, the right to act upon that belief is not protected from "a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs." 33 Therefore, it was perfectly constitutional for the school
authorities to expel children who refused to salute the flag based upon
their sincerely held religious beliefs. 34 Their remedy was not
constitutional protection in the courts, but rather the political right to
35
seek changes in the law "before legislative assemblies."
Perhaps what is most remarkable about the Gobitis decision is how
the Court seemed to believe the case was easy to decide. In the eyes of
Justice Frankfurter and the majority, requiring schoolchildren to recite
the Pledge was a matter of national unity and national cohesion, and
"[n]ational unity is the basis of national security.",36 Indeed, echoing
President Lincoln, the Court said the case created an existential dilemma
Id. at 598.
recent analysis of freedom of expression in public schools, see generally
JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 72-140 (2018). Although students have a
constitutional right to freedom of expression on public school campuses, school authorities
have substantial power to govern student speech "that is lewd, school-sponsored, or
pro-drug." Id. at 125; see also Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be "Free Speech" In
Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 47-48, 55 (2008) (discussing the power of
public schools "to regulate speech in the service of their educational mission"). A school
requirement regarding the recital of the Pledge of Allegiance is, of course, a school-sponsored
activity designed to teach students the meaning of the flag. See Mark Strasser, Establishing
the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, and the Marsh Wild Card,40 IND. L. REV. 529, 533
(2007) ("Rather than support religion, the salute and pledge 'are directed to a justifiable end
in the conduct of education in the public schools." (quoting Nicholls v. Lynn, 7 N.E.2d 577,
580 (Mass. 1937)).
,'
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599-600.
32 Id. at 593.
93 Id.
14 Id. at 599.
11 Id. at 600.
1c Id. at 595.
29

,9 Id. For a
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for our Nation-"Must a government of necessity be too strong for the
liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence. " 37 Justice
Frankfurter essentially concluded that with the survival of the Republic
at stake, the problems of a few schoolchildren who were Jehovah's
38
Witnesses "don't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world."
Justice Stone issued a powerful dissenting opinion in Gobitis, one
based upon the constitutional primacy "of freedom of the human mind and
spirit."39 As he put it so eloquently, "The very essence of ... liberty"
protected by the Constitution "is the freedom of the individual from
compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say, at least where
the compulsion is to bear false witness to his religion." 40 Therefore, these
constitutional guaranties, "withhold from the state any authority to
compel belief or the expression of it where that expression violates
religious convictions, whatever may be the legislative view of the
desirability of such compulsion." 41The state must resort to "other ways to
teach loyalty and patriotism" and the importance of the flag as a source of
national unity.42 Moreover, in contrast to the majority's extreme deference
to state legislatures and local school boards, Justice Stone emphasized
"the importance of a searching judicial inquiry" rather than surrendering
"the constitutional protection of the liberty of small minorities to the
popular will."43 Although Stone stood alone against Frankfurter's majority
of eight, his powerful and persuasive dissent was soon to be vindicated.
Gobitis was decided on June 3, 1940, 44 at a time when "French and
British troops were desperately being evacuated from Dunkirk."45 Indeed,
Gobitis was decided at a time when Hitler's "German forces were
occupying Norway and Denmark, and were about to invade the Low
Countries and France." 46 The reaction to the decision by toxically

97 Id. at 596 (quoting President Lincoln).
38 Id. at 599-600; CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. 1942). To explain why
the war effort is more important than personal preferences, Humphrey Bogart's character,
Rick Blaine, said: "Ilsa, I'm no good at being noble, but it doesn't take much to see that the
problems of three little people don't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world. Someday
you'll understand that." CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. 1942).
99 310 U.S. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42

Id. at 603-04.

41 Id. at 606.
44

Id. at 586.

45 Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in FIRST
AMENDMENT STORIES 99, 109 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
46 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 12 THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 221 (Stanley N. Katz, ed. 2006). This led some
courthouse jokers to refer to Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Gobitis as "Felix's
Fall-of-France opinion." Id. at 222.
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"patriotic" Americans was shameful. Jehovah's Witnesses were attacked,
their property was vandalized, and some were even "tarred and
feathered."47 Shamefully, "in August 1940, Albert Walkenhorst was lured
from his home in Norfolk, Nebraska, by a group of vigilantes posing as
48
fellow Witnesses and castrated."
B. Justice Jackson and the Second Flag Salute Case
Less than three years after Gobitispoisoned the First Amendment, it
was explicitly overruled by Barnette.49 "Barnette," says Professor (now
Judge) Jay Bybee, "was an antidote, the 'anti-Gobitis'-whatBrown v.
Board of Education was to Plessy, or the Fourteenth Amendment was to
Dred Scott."50 Barnette's overruling of Gobitis is also remarkable because
of its "daring switch of rationale" and the eloquent yet vague prose of
Justice Jackson in his landmark majority opinion. 51 Indeed, as Vincent
Blasi and Seana Shiffrin observe, "Seldom has a case outcome seemed so
52
obviously correct as that in Barnette and yet so difficult to justify."
Barnette is certainly canonical, a towering landmark of First Amendment
53
jurisprudence.
A great deal had happened in the short time between Gobitis and
Barnette. The United States had entered the war against Japan and Nazi
Germany. 54 Two members of the Gobitis Court, Chief Justice Hughes and
Justice McReynolds, had retired, and two new Roosevelt nominees,
Justice Jackson and Justice Rutledge, had been confirmed. 55 Remarkably,
"three members of the Gobitis majority, Justices Black, Douglas, and
Murphy," publicly announced that they "had changed their minds about

47 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 109-10.
48

Id. at 110.

49 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
50 Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power

Theory of the FirstAmendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 254 (2000).
Seldom in its history has a constitutional controversy generated such antipathy
within the Court, such widespread civic violence directly attributable to a
judicial decision, such anticipatory public recanting by individual justices, such
a daring switch of rationale, [and] such memorable and pointed prose in a
majority opinion ....
Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 99-100.
1' Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 99-100.
52 Id. at 100.

53 See Paul Horwitz, A Close Reading of Barnette, In Honor of Vincent Blasi, 13 FIU
L. REV. 689, 694-95 (2019) ("Barnette is one of the key opinions in the canon of First
Amendment Law.... Between them, the four opinions in Barnette read like a syllabus of the
major issues in First Amendment Law between 1943 and 2018.").
54 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 112.
55 Id. at 112-13.
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the constitutional questions presented by compulsory flag ceremonies in
public schools." 56
Shortly after the Court's decision in Gobitis, the West Virginia
legislature amended its laws to require all schools to teach history and
civics in a manner designed to foster "the ideals, principles and spirit of
Americanism." 57 In order to carry out the purpose of this law, the West
Virginia Board of Education adopted a resolution on January 9, 1942,
requiring all teachers and pupils to salute the flag. 58 The Board also
decreed that refusal to salute the flag shall "be regarded as an act of
insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly."59 The penalty for
refusing to salute the flag was expulsion from school, which carried with
it the risk of truancy and criminal sanctions for both the "delinquent" child
60
and his parents.
In Barnette, after children from three Jehovah's Witness' families
were expelled for refusing to salute the flag, attorneys for the Barnetts
and other families brought a class action in federal court seeking to enjoin
enforcement of the flag salute policy.6 1 After the plaintiffs prevailed before
a three-judge panel in the district court, the state appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court.6 2 Justice Jackson, writing for a 6-3
majority, affirmed the district court's injunction against enforcement of
the flag salute law and explicitly overruled Gobitis.6 3 Justice Jackson's
opinion in the case is iconic and still reverberates in the jurisprudence of
the First Amendment. Indeed, in the words of Professor Paul Horwitz,
Jackson's opinion in Barnette "is great because it is rich, fascinating,
64
eloquent, sweeping, and powerful."

5c Id. at 113; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, Douglas, and
Murphy, JJ., dissenting) ("Since we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this
is an appropriate occasion to state that we now believe that it also was wrongly decided.").
57 W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943).
58 Id. at 626.
59 Id.
GO Id. at 629. If convicted, the parents were "subject to [a] fine not exceeding $50 and
jail term not exceeding thirty days." Id. Children who were expelled for refusing to salute
the flag were also subject to being sent "to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined
juveniles." Id. at 630.
61 Id. at 629; Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 113. In order to avoid prosecution for
truancy, Gathie and Marie Barnett, the daughters of the lead plaintiff in Barnette, would
"travel to school each morning" only to be "sent home for refusing to salute the flag."
Bowman, supra note 10, at 19.
62 Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 255 (S.D. W. Va. 1942)
(granting Barnett's injunction against the school board); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630 (reviewing
the state Board of Education's direct appeal of the lower district court's decision).
63 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
64 Horwitz, supra note 53, at 695. Horwitz goes on to say that the opinion "is not great
because [its] passages are clear or clearly right, but because they feel clearly right." Id. at
696.
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Although the Barnette majority explicitly overruled Gobitis, Justice
Jackson made clear that the decision was not based upon religious
liberty,6 5 but rather upon "intellectual individualism" 6 6 and the free
speech right of the individual to resist "[c]ompulsory unification of
opinion."6 7 For the first time, the Supreme Court recognized that freedom
of speech protects both the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking: "To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say
that a Bill of Rights which guards the individuars right to speak his own
mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not
68
in his mind."
The Court's move from religious freedom to free speech was very
significant because rather than focus on whether a few religious
dissenters were entitled to a free exercise exemption from the flag
salute requirement, the issue before the Court became whether the states
even have "power ... to impose the flag salute discipline upon school
children in general."6 9 If the state lacked power to compel the flag
salute, the requirement would be categorically unconstitutional without
any balancing or weighing of competing interests. Remarkably, "[t]his
re-conception of the central constitutional issues at stake came largely at
the Court's own initiative," because the briefs in support of the children
and their families "had focused almost exclusively on freedom of
70
religion."
Justice Jackson framed the question presented in the case brilliantly
so as to imply a clear answer to the issue: "The question which underlies
the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so touching
matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the
individual by official authority under powers committed to any political
organization under our Constitution. We examine rather than assume
existence of this power .
"71 Rather than viewing the case as posing an
existential threat to the survival of the Republic, as Justice Frankfurter
maintained in Gobitis,72 Justice Jackson observed "that the strength of
government to maintain itself' was not threatened by a First Amendment
protecting a "handful of children" from being expelled for refusing to

65 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634 ("Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession
of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held."); see also id. at 635
(noting that Gobitis "only examined and rejected a claim based on religious beliefs of
immunity from an unquestioned general rule").
G Id. at 641-42.
67 Id. at 641.
68 Id. at 634.
c9 Id. at 635.
70 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 115.
71 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635-36.
72 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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participate in the flag salute. 73 Indeed, ordered liberty under a Bill of
Rights "tends to diminish fear and jealousy of strong government, and by
74
making us feel safe to live under it makes for its better support."
Thus, the issue for Justice Jackson and the majority was not a choice
between weak and strong government, but rather between "individual
freedom of mind" and a government-mandated "uniformity for which
history indicates a disappointing and disastrous end."75 Indeed, the Court
acknowledged explicitly that an important purpose of freedom of speech
under the First Amendment is to nip authoritarian government in the bud
by denying tyrants-including "village tyrants" 76 -the power to "coerce
uniformity of sentiment" by compelling flag salutes or other affirmations
of belief. 77 Responding to "the very heart of the Gobitis opinion" and its
recognition of the grave importance of national unity, 78 Jackson composed
an eloquent indictment of authoritarian government that still stirs the
souls of lovers of liberty today:
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so
strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably
no deeper division of our people could proceed from any
provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what
doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall
compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such
attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort
from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber
of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and
dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity,
down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian
enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon
find themselves
exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
79
graveyard.

73 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 636.
74

Id.

71 Id. at 637.
7, Id. at 638; see also id. at 641 ("We set up government by consent of the governed,
and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent.").
No such tyrant "who acts under the color of law is beyond reach of the Constitution." Id. at
638.
77 Id. at 640.
78 Id. Justice Jackson affirmed the importance of national unity but observed that
the problem with a mandatory flag salute policy "is whether under our Constitution
compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement." Id.
79 Id. at 641.
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To illustrate how authoritarian government compels speech from its
citizens, Justice Jackson specifically listed three historical examples of
such tyranny: first, he noted the persecution of early Christians for
80
refusing "to participate in ceremonies before the statue of the emperor;"
second, he recounted "[t]he story of William Tell's sentence to shoot an
apple off his son's head for refusal to salute a bailiffs hat;" 81 and finally,
he spoke of William Penn and the Quakers who "suffered punishment
82
rather than uncover their heads in deference to any civil authority."
Even a symbol as widely revered as our Nation's flag can mean different
things to different people. 83 Thus, for the government to compel
schoolchildren to salute the flag is tyrannical and even worse than
compelled silence because it invades the private space of one's mind and
beliefs. 84 As Professor Robert George said: "Ordinary authoritarians are
content to forbid people from saying things they know or believe to be true.
Totalitarians insist on forcing people to say things they know or believe to
85
be untrue."
And protection against these tyrannical features of authoritarianism
and totalitarianism-the constitutional shelter for those who seek to
dissent from government-imposed flag salutes and affirmations of
belief-was created by Justice Jackson's immortal "fixed star" passage in
Barnette:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling
the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations
on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
80 Id. at 633 n.13.
81 Id.
82

Id.

Id. at 632-33 ("A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what
is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn."). For example, in July of
2019, Nike cancelled the release of a sneaker featuring a Betsy Ross 13-star flag design after
Colin Kaepernick, a former NFL quarterback and political activist, "privately criticized the
design to Nike." Tiffany Hsu et al., Nike Drops 'Betsy Ross Flag' Sneaker After Kaepernick
Criticizes It, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/business/betsyross-shoe-kaepernick-nike.htmlsearchResultPosition- 1.
84 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34 ("It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.").
85
Robert
P.
George
(@RobertPGeorge),
FACEBOOK
(Aug.
2,
2017),
https://www.facebook.com/RobertPGeorge/posts/10155417655377906.
83
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which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
86
Constitution to reserve from all official control.
Government-compelled affirmations of belief and speech must be
nipped in the bud lest they lead to ever more authoritarian or totalitarian
inquisitions. 87 As Justice Jackson put it, "the First Amendment to our
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these
beginnings." 88 Thus, in Barnette the Free Speech Clause became a strong
defense for individual liberty against the dark arts of totalitarian and
89
authoritarian laws compelling speech.
Justice Black and Justice Douglas, who were part of the Gobitis
majority upholding the Minersville flag salute policy, 90 wrote a brief but
important concurring opinion to explain the "reasons for [their] change of
view." 9 1"Love of country," they declared, "must spring from willing hearts
and free minds" and a law that compels affirmations of belief "when
enforced against conscientious objectors ... is a handy implement for
disguised religious persecution." 92 Although the Barnette Court's holding
protects a general right under the Free Speech Clause to speaker
autonomy, the concurrence demonstrates how free speech for everyone
necessarily entails freedom for each one.9 3 The Free Speech Clause
protects secular conscientious objectors and religious conscientious
objectors; it protects one component of religious liberty by protecting free
94
speech for all.
Justice Frankfurter issued a dissent which has been described as a
"combined jeremiad and lamentation from a constitutional prophet
95
wounded by the jurisprudential heresies of his colleagues on the bench."
8c

319U.S.at642.

See Richard Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar
Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 437-39 (1996) (discussing how the Barnette
decision was largely influenced by anti-Nazism and anti-Sovietism movements).
88 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
87

89

Id. at 641-42.

90 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
91 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 643 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
92

Id. at 644.

93 Compare id. at 642 (majority opinion) (explaining how the First Amendment is
designed to prevent the government from invading "the sphere of intellect and spirit"), with
id. at 643-44 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) ("These laws must, to be consistent with the
First Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints consistent with a
society of free men.").
94 Id. at 634-35, 638-39 (majority opinion) ("While religion supplies appellees' motive
for enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share
these religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the
individual."); id. at 644 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring) (describing how the enforcement
of a ceremony against conscientious objectors "is a handy implement for disguised religious
persecution" and "is inconsistent with our Constitution's plan and purpose").
95 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 119.
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Another way of understanding the duel between Justice Frankfurter and
Justice Jackson is to view it as a collision between excessive judicial
restraint and well-focused judicial engagement. Justice Frankfurter
asserted that the "only and very narrow function" of judicial review under
the First Amendment is "to determine whether within the broad grant of
authority vested in legislatures they have exercised a judgment for which
reasonable justification can be offered."9 6 Protection of free speech is not a
question of constitutional law for the courts to protect, but one of politics
to be decided by "the ballot" and "the processes of democratic
government." 97 For Justice Jackson, however, courts must engage and
protect explicit constitutional liberties: "The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
98
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
Liberties explicitly protected by the Constitution, such as "free speech"
and "freedom of worship," are "fundamental rights [that] may not be
submitted to a vote" and that "depend on the outcome of no elections." 99
Justice Jackson's landmark opinion in Barnette has aged well and
survived the test of time and history.
C. Barnette's Doctrine: No Compelled Expression
of Beliefs, Creeds, or Statements of Values
Although some commentators believe that the doctrine of Barnette is
"surprisingly difficult to defend" because some of its lyrical language
"threatens to be overbroad," 100 the essential doctrine of the opinion is
reasonably clear and has been liquidated and settled by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. 10 1 "Although it was once possible to read
Barnette as only prohibiting government from compelling affirmations of
belief, such as the Pledge of Allegiance, it soon became clear that the
compelled speech doctrine also forbids government from compelling the

96 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 649 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 647; see also id. at 667 ("And even though legislation relates to civil liberties,
our duty of deference to those who have the responsibility for making the laws is no less
relevant or less exacting .... To strike down a law like this is to deny a power to all
government.").
98 Id. at 638 (majority opinion).
99

Id.

100 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 121.
101 See William Baude, ConstitutionalLiquidation,71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2019) (citing

NLRB u. Canning,134 S.Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014)) (addressing the Supreme Court's acceptance
of James Madison's view that the Constitution's meaning would likely need to be liquidated
and settled over time).

REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:265

dissemination of unwanted expression." 102 Thus, under the Free Speech
Clause, government may not compel a person to express or disseminate
any belief, creed, or statement of values, whether it is the government's
own message or the message of a third-party.103 Clearly, the government
has power to express its own opinions, or to endorse the opinions of a third
party, however, it may not compel a person to become an echo chamber for
such opinions. 104 Although the competing sides of various issues may use
the political process to seek legislation adopting their opinions into law,
"Barnettesuggests one limit: one cannot insist that the victory of one side,
of one creed or value, be memorialized by compelling the defeated side to
105
literally give voice to its submission."
Moreover, the right to resist compelled expression does not require
any conscientious objection to the compelled dogma. One cannot be
compelled to express any idea, even one he or she might agree with. 106 Nor
is it necessary to demonstrate that one's objection is based upon fear of
being publicly associated with a creed against one's will. 107 None of these
things matter. The purpose of the Barnette doctrine is to nip authoritarian
and totalitarian government in the bud by protecting freedom of the mind,
those "few cubic centimeters inside your skull,"108 from being controlled
by laws or government policies compelling expression. Justice Jackson's
opinion in Barnette is revered because it speaks to the hearts of those who
love liberty. It deserves all of the honor that has been showered upon it.

102 Richard F. Duncan, A Piece of Cake or Religious Expression: Masterpiece Cakeshop
and the First Amendment, NEB. L. REV. 6 (Jan. 7, 2019), https://lawreview.unl.edu/piececake-or-religious-expression-masterpiece-cakeshop-and-first-amendment.
103 Id. at 6-8; see also Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEx. L. REV.
355, 368-70 (2018) (discussing how the government may not compel people to say things
they wish not to say).
104 Horwitz, supra note 53, at 724 ("[G]overnment is free ... to offer various
pronouncements that constitute an orthodoxy or 'officially preferred "right position."' What
it cannot do is 'compel citizens to affirm such opinions.").
105

Id. at 723.

106 Id. at 724.
107 Justice Frankfurter's dissent asserts that nothing in the compelled flag salute
policy restricted the right of dissenting schoolchildren and their parents from publicly
disavowing their support for any objectionable meaning contained in the flag salute. See W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 664 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("All
channels of affirmative free expression are open to both children and parents."). But, of
course, that would effectively compel them to express both the ideas contained in the flag
salute and their opposition to those ideas. It would compound the compelled speech burden
and the violation of the sanctity of control over one's mind, one's thoughts, and one's beliefs
by requiring multiple statements of belief and disbelief
108 ORWELL, supra note 3, at 27. Or, to revisit Justice Jackson's words, the First
Amendment protects "the sphere of intellect and spirit" from being invaded by governmental
authorities. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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D. Some of Barnette's Progeny: Herein of Creeds on License Plates and
Compelled Expression in Parades
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Wooley v. Maynard to strike
down a law that demonstrates that even states that proclaim their love of
liberty can become authoritarian about their libertarianism. 109 Although
the "fighting faiths" of an era do not always age well, 110 in their time they
seem to be irrefutable and therefore universal. Such was the case in New
'
Hampshire with its fighting truth, "Live Free or Die."111
The State of New Hampshire was so sure about the universal truth
of its state motto that it required this homage to freedom to be embossed
on all noncommercial license plates and, under another law, made it a
misdemeanor to knowingly obscure "the figures or letters on any number
plate." 112 George Maynard and his wife Maxine, the appellees in the case,
were Jehovah's Witnesses who considered the motto "repugnant to their
moral, religious, and political beliefs." 113 In order to avoid displaying this
ideological message on their license plates, Mr. and Mrs. Maynard covered
114
the motto with tape and soon found themselves in conflict with the law.
Ironically, despite its motto to "Live Free or Die," New Hampshire
repeatedly prosecuted Mr. Maynard for obscuring the motto on his license
plate. 115 He actually served a brief sentence in jail for acting upon, rather
116
than displaying, the "Live Free or Die" creed.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a majority opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, held that New Hampshire had violated
the First Amendment by compelling "an individual to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private
property." 117 It did not matter that Maynard was not required to actually
speak any words, affirm any beliefs, or create or compose any expressive
message. It was enough that the state had required him to act as a "mobile
billboard for the state's ideological motto ...[a]s a condition to driving an
automobile-a virtual necessity for most Americans." 118 Moreover, the
Court focused on an often-missed First Amendment problem in compelled
speech cases-almost inevitably, these cases involve the state compelling
109 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977).
110 As Justice Holmes once observed, "time has upset many fighting faiths." Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706-07.
112 Id. at 707.
113
114

Id.
Id. at 707-08.

115 Duncan, supra note 102, at 6-7 (discussing how Maynard was prosecuted for
covering up New Hampshire's libertarian credo).
116 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707-08.
117 Id. at 713.
118 Id. at 715.
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not just speech, but a particular viewpoint, a free speech violation at the
core of the First Amendment.119 As the Court explained: "The First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view
different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New
120
Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable."
Focusing on the First Amendment's protection of "individual freedom
of [the] mind,"12 1 the Court stated the "no compelled speech" rule in clear
and unqualified language:
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all. A system which secures the right to
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such
concepts. 122
The significance of Wooley is that it makes clear that the landmark
doctrine of Barnette protects an individual's intellectual autonomy not
merely from compelled affirmations of belief, but also from attempts by
the state to compel an individual to speak or even to help disseminate any
religious, political, or ideological creed.
The Supreme Court has also made clear that the First Amendment
protects one private individual from being compelled by law to express,
convey, or help disseminate the political, ideological, or social ideas of
another private individual. Moreover, this doctrine applies even if the
compelled third-party expression arises in the context of a public
accommodations law that treats private expression as a public
accommodation. 123 In Hurley, the Court was tasked with deciding the
reach of the no-compelled-speech doctrine in a case involving a sexual

119Id. (discussing how Barnette dealt with a state measure that forced an individual
to adopt a certain viewpoint).
120 Id.
Although a content-based restriction of speech is a grievous First Amendment
problem, viewpoint-based discrimination by government is a "more blatant" and "egregious
form of content discrimination." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995). Thus, when the government compels a private individual to express a
particular ideological message or creed, as in Barnette and Wooley, it is an egregious
viewpoint-based wrong under the First Amendment.
121 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943)).
122 Id. (citations omitted).
123 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
573-74 (1995). See Duncan, supra note 102, at 7-8.
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orientation discrimination complaint against the organizers of the Boston
St. Patrick's Day parade. 124
The case arose when GLIB, a group "of gay, lesbian, and bisexual
descendants of the Irish immigrants," wished to march in the Boston St.
Patrick's Day Parade in order "to express pride in their Irish heritage as
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals."1 25 When the private
sponsors of the parade, John J. "Wacko" Hurley and the South Boston
Allied War Veterans Council, refused to allow GLIB to march as a group
in the parade, GLIB sued to enforce the Massachusetts Public
Accommodation law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation "in any place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement." 126 The state trial court held that the St. Patrick's Day
Parade was a place of public accommodation under the law and that the
Councils decision to ban GLIB because of "its values and its message" was
127
illegal discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Moreover, in a wonderful exercise of authoritarianism, the trial
judge stated that to deny GLIB the right to march in the parade was not
only illegal, but also inconsistent with "a proper celebration" of St.
Patrick's Day, which, according to the judge, "requires diversity and
inclusiveness." 128 Perhaps there is no better example of Justice Jackson's
iconic authoritarian official, the "village tyrant," than this presumptuous
trial judge telling the private organizer of a holiday parade which values
and ideas are required for a "proper celebration" of the holiday.
Before reaching the compelled speech issue in the case, the Supreme
Court had to decide two preliminary matters. First, was the St. Patrick's
Day Parade a type of expression protected by the First Amendment, or
was it, as the state courts had concluded, "nonexpressive conduct" outside
the protection of the Free Speech Clause? 129 Second, was the
Massachusetts public accommodation law a content-neutral prohibition of
discrimination in the marketplace for goods and recreational services or,
as applied to the private citizens promoting the parade, did it operate as
a state-compelled expression of an ideological message? 130 The Court
answered both questions on the side of freedom of speech.

124
125
126

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
Id. at 561.
Id.

127 Id.
at 561-63. Remarkably, the trial judge said that rejection of the values and
message of an LGBT group constitutes discrimination on the basis of the sexual orientation
of the group's members. Id. at 562. Apparently, discrimination against the message is,
without more, discrimination against the person. Id.
128
129

Id. at 562.
Id. at 567-68.

1,0 Id. at 572 (noting that "on its face" the Massachusetts public accommodations law
did not "target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content").
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First, it held that the St. Patrick's Day Parade is a "form of
expression " 131 even if it is not designed to express any particularized
message about politics or ideology other than to march in celebration of
St. Patrick and Irish-American heritage. 132 As the unanimous majority
opinion put it, the "protected expression that inheres in a parade is not
limited to its banners and songs" or its intent to express any particular
message. 133 Like the abstract art of a painter such as Jackson Pollock, a
parade celebrating a holiday is expression protected by the First
34
Amendment even if it lacks "a narrow, succinctly articulable message." 1
As to the second issue, the Court stated that the Massachusetts
public accommodations
law, although facially targeting only
discriminatory conduct-not speech-"has been applied in a peculiar
way," 135 because the "state courts' application of the statute had the effect
of declaring the [parade] sponsor's speech itself to be the public
accommodation." 136 Thus, Justice Souter's unanimous opinion held that
the state court order violated "the fundamental rule of protection under
the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
37
content of his own message." 1
The Court emphasized that the sponsors' objection to GLIB was not
the sexual orientation of its members, who were not as individuals barred
from marching in the parade, but rather "to the admission of GLIB as its
own parade unit carrying its own banner." 138 In other words, the objection
was to GLIB's message, not to its members as individual persons. As a
result, the state courts had ordered the petitioners in effect "to alter the
expressive content of their parade." 139
Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, held that
the state court's "mandate violates the First Amendment" 140 and
compared the idea of speaker autonomy-the right of "a private speaker
to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent
on another"-to that of a composer of music who selects which notes to
include and which to exclude from his musical score. 141 Thus, the
constitutional ideal of intellectual autonomy for speakers, artists, and
parade organizers, which originated in Barnette, now had the support of a
unanimous Supreme Court.
','

Id. at 568.

132

Id. at 573-75.

1' Id. at 569.
134

1,5

Id.
Id. at 572.

1' Id. at 573.
137 Id.

1,8 Id. at 572.

19 Id. at 572-73.
140 Id. at 559.
141 Id. at 574.
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Hurley also illustrates some additional free speech concerns that
typically arise from speech mandates. First, these mandates often involve
viewpoint discrimination, because they compel the speaker to express
either the government's viewpoint, as in Wooley, 142 or the viewpoint of a
third party, as in Hurley. For example, the mandate in Hurley, which
required the sponsors of the parade to allow GLIB to march in support of
gay pride, 143 interfered with their right "not to propound a particularpoint
144
of view."
Moreover, the law operated as an unconstitutional condition, because
it required the sponsors of the parade to choose between two First
145
Amendment rights, the right to speak and the right not to speak.
Massachusetts required the sponsors to choose between their right to
parade in support of their own expression, and their right to refrain from
fostering the expression of GLIB.146 They could have "one constitutional
right or the other, but not both;" "[t]he First Amendment does not permit
147
government to put a speaker to that odious choice."

II. JUSTICE KENNEDY GOES OUT LIKE A LION
A. JusticeKennedy's Last Hurrah:
Authoritarianismand 'ForwardThinking"
Although some of Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence has been criticized
as little more than bad poetry, or in the biting words of Justice Scalia, as
echoing "the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie,"148 Kennedy has
built a considerable jurisprudential legacy protecting freedom of speech
under the First Amendment. 149 Even in cases in which a majority voted to
uphold a First Amendment claim, Kennedy's passionate concern for
freedom of speech, particularly his strong objections to laws restricting
speech on the basis of its content or viewpoint, often led him to write
142

See supra notes 109-122 and accompanying text.

143 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.

Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
See id. at 579 (stating that the law "is not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one").
146 Id.
147 See Duncan, supra note 102, at 13; see also Volokh, supra note 103, at 361
(government may not compel a speaker to include unwanted speech as a condition to
expressing the speaker's own "speech product").
148 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat & Matthew Struhar, Justice Kennedy's Free Speech
Jurisprudence:A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 167, 167
(2013) (describing Justice Kennedy's reputation as a free speech advocate); see generally
KNOWLES, supra note 5, at 53-87 (discussing Justice Kennedy's free speech legacy); FRANK
144
145

J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY MEANING OF

LIBERTY 75-101 (2009) (same).
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concurring opinions calling for "even greater protection" for freedom of
15
expression. 0
The Supreme Court's October Term 2017-2018 featured three
compelled speech cases. 151 Justice Kennedy was in the majority of all
three. He wrote the majority opinion in one of them, 152 joined the majority
in a second, 153 and joined the majority and wrote a powerful concurring
opinion in the third. 154
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the compelled speech issue concerned a
Christian wedding cake artist, Jack Phillips, who considered his custom
cake creations to be "artistic expression celebrating the beauty of
marriage as God designed marriage." 155 Therefore, although he was happy
to serve all customers, without regard to sexual orientation, he could not
in good conscience create wedding cakes designed to celebrate same-sex
marriages.156 The state of Colorado enforced its public accommodations
law against Mr. Phillips and ordered him to "cease and desist from
discriminating against ... same-sex couples by refusing to sell them
157
wedding cakes or any product [he] would sell to heterosexual couples."
In other words, Colorado required Phillips to choose between his right as
an artist to create custom wedding cakes celebrating opposite-sex
marriage and his right not to create wedding cakes celebrating same-sex
marriage. 158
Because
the
no-compelled-speech
doctrine
was
already
well-established, the primary issue facing the Court under the Free
Speech Clause was whether custom wedding cakes are artistic expression

110 See Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (departing from the majority's reasoning, Justice Kennedy defined
public forum more expansively, thereby shielding more areas from speech regulations);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (maintaining that content-discriminatory statutes should beper se
unconstitutional); KNOWLES, supra note 5, at 67 (observing that during his years on the
Supreme Court "Kennedy has staked out a lonely but brave position vociferously objecting
to content-based regulations of speech" by writing separately even when the majority voted
to uphold free speech rights).
15 October Term 2017, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/
ot2017/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31
(AFSCME), 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Nat'l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra

(NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
152 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
15 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459.

NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Duncan, supra note 102, at 2.
15c Id. at 3.
157 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726 (citation omitted).
158 See Duncan, supra note 102, at 13 (noting the unconstitutional choice forced
between the right to speak and the right to not speak).
154
155
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protected by the doctrine.15 9 In other words, are custom wedding cakes
more like pizza or breadsticks served in an Italian restaurant, or like a
sculpture or oil painting created by a fine artist. 16 0 Masterpiece Cakeshop
was particularly difficult for Justice Kennedy because it involved a "clash"
between free speech and religious liberty on one side and gay rights and
marriage equality on the other. 16 1 Perhaps because of this clashing of
interests, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in MasterpieceCakeshop did
not decide the compelled speech issue. Instead, the Court held that
Colorado had violated the Free Exercise Clause because the state did not
treat Phillips with "the religious neutrality that the Constitution
16 2
requires."
Although Justice Kennedy did not decide the compelled speech issue
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, his opinion did contain some powerful dicta in
support of Phillips' free speech claim. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Kennedy observed that although the free speech issue in this case "is
difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might
have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech," 16 3 Phillips'
claim "is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our
understanding of their meaning."16 4 Moreover, "if a baker refuse[s] to
design a special cake with words or images celebrating the marriage,"
these additional details "might make a difference."16 5 These insights
might well shed a great deal of light on future cases involving commercial
artists and compelled artistic expression.
Justice Kennedy joined Justice Alito's majority opinion in a second
important compelled speech case, Janus v. American Federationof State,
County & Municipal Employees, Council 31,166 in which the Court struck
down a state law requiring public employees "to subsidize a union, even if
they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes
in collective bargaining and related activities."16 7 This, said the Court,

159 Id. at 9, 13.
160 Id.

161See Zachary S. Price, Symmetric Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece
Cakeshop and the Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1291 (2019) (noting
the political conflict between traditional principles and civil rights equality). Some scholars
believe the religious liberty holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop was a very narrow one. Id. I
believe it is not necessarily a narrow holding. See Duncan, supra note 102, at 10-11, 23-24
(noting both the free speech and free exercise implications of the holding).
162Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
163 Id. at 1723.
164

Id.

165 Id.

166 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2448, 2459 (2018).
167 Id. at 2459-60.
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violates the Free Speech Clause because it compels dissenting workers "to
68
subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern." 1
The force of the no-compelled-speech doctrine as a defense against
authoritarian government was strong in Janus. Justice Alito, speaking for
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch
observed that when government compels speech, it inflicts even more
damage than when it merely restricts speech. 16 9 This is so because it is
"always demeaning" to compel "free and independent individuals to
endorse ideas they find objectionable." 170 Invoking Thomas Jefferson, the
Janus Court forcefully observed that to compel an individual to betray his
personal convictions by subsidizing the ideas of another "is sinful and
171
tyrannical."
Justice
Kennedy's
inspirational
manifesto
on
the
no-compelled-speech doctrine as a shield against authoritarian
government, an opinion cementing his legacy as one of the greatest
defenders of freedom of speech in Supreme Court history, was issued as a
concurring opinion in NIFLA. 172 In NIFLA, the state of California required
pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to provide certain "government-drafted"
notices 173 to their clients and in their advertisements. For example,
licensed pro-life clinics were required to "notify women that California
provides free or low-cost services, including abortions" and to provide a
phone number to learn more about those services. 174 Justice Thomas,
writing for a majority that included Justice Kennedy, held that this
compelled expression was an unconstitutional "content-based regulation
of speech." 175 But the real fireworks were provided by Justice Kennedy in
a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito
and Gorsuch.
Justice Kennedy made clear that he joined the majority opinion "in
all respects," and was writing a separate opinion only to make an even
stronger case against California's compelled speech law. 176 Essentially, he
wrote to underscore two points. First, that California was guilty of
something more serious than a content-based regulation of speech; rather,
the California law constituted "viewpoint discrimination" and served as "a
paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when government

1G8

Id. at 2460.

Id. at 2459, 2464.
170 Id. at 2464.
'c9

171

Id.

172Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378
(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173Id. at 2369 (majority opinion).
174 Id. at 2368.

175Id. at 2367, 2371.
176Id. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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177
seeks to impose its own message in the place of individual speech."
Second, Justice Kennedy wrote an eloquent and powerful denunciation of
compelled speech as a deplorable and tyrannical characteristic of
authoritarian government.
Justice Kennedy described the compelled speech law as one in which
California had required pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to disseminate
the state's message "advertising abortions" and thereby "to contradict
their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical,
ethical, or religious precepts."178 But what is even more noteworthy is
Kennedy's response to the self-congratulatory statement by the California
Legislature that "the Act was part of California's legacy of 'forward
thinking."' 179 Justice Kennedy observed that it is not "forward thinking"
to compel ideological uniformity and continued:

It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First Amendment
as ratified in 1791; to understand the history of authoritarian
government as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that
history since then shows how relentless authoritarian regimes
are in their attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those
lessons onward as we seek to preserve and teach the necessity of
freedom of speech for the generations to come. Governments
must not be allowed to force persons to express a message
contrary to their deepest convictions. Freedom of speech secures
freedom of thought and belief. This law imperils those
liberties. 180
These words of Justice Kennedy, echoing the eloquent opinion of
Justice Jackson in Barnette,181 are indeed inspirational words to share
with our children when we endeavor to teach them about the blessings of
liberty and the fundamental importance of both the right to speak and the
177 Id. at 2379.
178

Id.

179

Id.

180Id. Justice Kennedy also saw the specter of authoritarianism in his plurality
opinion in the "stolen valor" case:
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense,
whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper, would
endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about which false
statements are punishable. That governmental power has no clear limiting
principle. Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need
Oceania's Ministry of Truth.
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012). Justice Kennedy's reference to Oceania
and its Ministry of Truth is, of course, to the description of Thought Police and thought
crimes in George Orwell's greatest novel, 1984. Id.
181 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (asserting
that the government does not have the ability to coerce speech).
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right not to be compelled to speak. The no-compelled-speech doctrine is
deeply-rooted in the Court's free speech jurisprudence and serves as a
182
powerful defense against "authoritarian regimes" and their dark arts.
B. Compelled Speech in the Post-Kennedy Era: The Telescope Media Case
On August 23, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit decided an important compelled speech case 183 concerning
a videography business, same-sex marriage, and the following question
presented: "Carl and Angel Larsen wish to make wedding videos. Can
Minnesota require them to produce videos of same-sex weddings, even if
the message would conflict with their own beliefs?" 184 This case concerned
Carl and Angel Larsen, a couple who own and operate Telescope Media
Group, a business through which the Larsens produce and make
films using "their 'unique skill[s] to identify and tell compelling stories
through video."' 185 The Larsens insist that they "gladly work with all
people-regardless of their race, sexual orientation, sex, religious beliefs,
or any other classification,"18 6 however, because of their religious
conscience and their desire to honor God, they are unwilling to produce or
make films expressing messages that contradict biblical truths about
abortion, racial equality, sexual morality, or marriage.18 7 Therefore,
although they wish to make films promoting marriage as a "sacrificial
covenant between one man and one woman," they cannot in good
conscience produce videos that promote or celebrate same-sex marriage. 188
Clearly, the Larsens' objection is to the message expressed by a video
celebrating a same-sex marriage, not to the identity of the customers who
wish to commission the video.
Under Minnesota's public accommodations law, however, the
Larsens were
required "to produce both opposite-sex
and
same-sex-wedding videos, or none at all."189 Moreover, at oral argument
in the case, the state of Minnesota made clear that the Larsens must be
willing to "depict same- and opposite-sex weddings in an equally 'positive'
light" or be guilty of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 190 Minnesota thus viewed its public accommodation laws as
requiring wedding videographers to express a positive viewpoint about

182

Id. at 642.

18, Telescope Media Grp. V. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8Th Cir. 2019).
184

Id. at 747.

185

Id.

186 Id. at 748.

Id.
188Id.
187

189 Id.

190Id. at 748-49.
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same-sex marriage without regard to the filmmakers' deeply-held
religious and ideological views about the definition and the good of
marriage. 191 Moreover, in addition to civil remedies, violation of
Minnesota's antidiscrimination law is a crime punishable by fines and
92
j al. 1
The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss; 193 however
the Eighth Circuit reversed by a two to one vote. 194 The primary free
speech issue before the court was whether Minnesota's public
accommodation laws, as applied to a wedding videographer who objected
to making videos expressing a positive view of same-sex marriage,
constituted merely the regulation of conduct and not speech. 195 Does the
law primarily regulate the conduct of the Larsens' commercial wedding
service, or does it compel the Larsens to "speak favorably about same-sex
marriage if they choose to speak favorably about opposite-sex
19 6
marriage."
The majority in Telescope Media, in a powerful and persuasive
opinion by Judge Stras, concluded that, "Speech is not conduct just
because the government says it is." 197 The court made clear that wedding
videography is "a form of speech that is entitled to First Amendment
protection"198 and that it makes no "difference that the Larsens are
expressing their views" about the meaning and sanctity of marriage
"through a for-profit enterprise." 199 The court found that Minnesota's
threatened enforcement of the public accommodation laws against the
Larsens "is at odds with the 'cardinal constitutional command' against
compelled speech." 200 Moreover, since the law "compels the Larsens to
speak favorably about same-sex marriage if they choose to speak favorably
about opposite-sex marriage[,] ... [i]t operates as a content-based
201
regulation of their speech."
Actually, since it compels positive speech about same-sex marriage,
it arguably constitutes a viewpoint-based speech mandate-if the Larsens
make videos expressing their actual views about the sanctity of traditional
191 Id. at 748.

192 See Telescope Media Grp. V. Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1098 & n.4 (D. Minn.
2017) (noting that violation of the statute is a misdemeanor, which is punishable by jail time
of up to ninety days and/or a fine of up to $1,000), affd in part, reu'd in part and remanded
sub nom., 936 F.3d 740 (8Th Cir. 2019).
191 Telescope Media Grp.Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 1097.Id. at 63.
194 Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 762.
195 Id. at 752.
196 Id.

197Id. at 747, 752.
198 Id. at 750.
199 Id. at 751.

200 Id. at 752 (quoting Janus u. Am. Fedn of State, County & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018)).
201 Id.

at 752.
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marriage, they are compelled by law to contradict their own beliefs and
express an equally-positive viewpoint about same-sex marriage. In other
words, the law requires the Larsens to speak about marriage with a forked
tongue. Thus, as in Hurley,20 2 although on their face Minnesota's public
accommodation laws are content-neutral regulations of conduct, as
applied to the Larsens' wedding videos these laws are content- or even
viewpoint-based speech mandates that violate the no-compelled-speech
doctrine of Barnette, Wooley, Hurley, NIFLA, and many other cases. As
Justice Kennedy made so clear in his NIFLA concurrence, it is not
"forward thinking" to compel ideological uniformity about the equal
goodness of opposite-sex and same-sex marriage. 203 The First Amendment
is a powerful defense against authoritarian government and its relentless
attempts to "force persons to express a message contrary to their deepest
convictions. 204
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:
WHY THE NO-COMPELLED-SPEECH DOCTRINE MATTERS

"There was truth and there was untruth, and ifyou clung to
the truth even against the whole world, you were not mad."
20 5
-George Orwell
Starting in Barnette and most recently in Janus and NIFLA, the
Supreme Court has strongly declared that government may not "coerce
uniformity of sentiment"206 on issues of public concern by compelling
expression of beliefs, creeds, or statements of values. This doctrine is of
fundamental importance in any society that believes, in the words of
Justice Kennedy quoted near the beginning of this article, that "The right
to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from
the government because speech is the beginning of thought."207 Therefore,
free men and free women must have autonomy over their speech, over that
which they choose to say and that which they choose not to say.

202 Hurleyv. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 561
(1995); see also supra notes 121-138 and accompanying text.
203 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378
(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
204 NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
205 ORWELL, supra note 3, at 217.
206 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943); see also Janus v.
Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (concluding
that non-members cannot be compelled to support the speech of union members); NIFLA,
138 S. Ct. at 2371 (holding that forcing pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to advertise for statesubsidized abortions was improper).
207 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
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Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a dissident imprisoned for his activism by
the totalitarian regime of the former Soviet Union, 208 has captured the
essence of the right not to speak as being based upon each individuars
conscience and commitment to the truth as he or she understands it.209 In
an essay entitled Live Not By Lies, Solzhenitsyn said "let us refuse to say
that which we do not think,"2 10 and went on to explain that "an honest
man[,] worthy of [the] respect both by [his] children and [his]
contemporaries... [w]ill not depict, foster or broadcast a single idea which
he can only see is false or a distortion of the truth whether it be in
painting, sculpture, photography, technical science, or music. 2 11 As
Orwell explained in 1984, his seminal novel of life in fictional Oceania
under a totalitarian regime that used extreme coercion to mandate
uniformity of opinion, if an individual "clung to the truth" as he
understood it, he might against all odds maintain his human dignity and
his sanity. 212 Solzhenitsyn put it even more clearly: "And the simplest and
most accessible key to our self-neglected liberation lies right here:
Personal non-participation in lies. Though lies conceal everything, though
2 3
lies embrace everything, but not with any help from me." 1
Although our society in no way resembles the tyrannical
totalitarianism of 1984's Oceana, we nevertheless frequently encounter
"village tyrants" who use the law to compel citizens to speak, publish or
create expression adopting the favored message of the state or a third
2 14
person, or to attend "rallies or lectures espousing the right views."
According to Kelly Sarabyn, such coercive methods are deployed "in order

208 CHARLES E. ZIEGLER, THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA 102 (2d ed. 2009) (revealing that
Solzhenitsyn was imprisoned for eight years and exiled for three years simply for making
derogatory comments about Stalin in his personal correspondence to his family); The Editors
of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aleksandr-Solzhenitsyn
(last visited
Mar. 17, 2020) (explaining how Solzhenitsyn endured prison, labor camps, and exile for his
politically critical works).
209 See Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Live Not By Lies, ORTHODOXY TODAY http://www.
orthodoxytoday.org/articles/SolhenitsynLies.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) (noting that to
liberate themselves, people should refuse to believe the lies the government tells them).
210
211

Id.
Id.

Solzhenitsyn penned this essay in 1974 and it circulated among Moscow's
intellectuals at the time. It is dated Feb. 12, the same day that secret police broke
into his apartment and arrested him. The next day he was exiled to West
Germany. The essay is a call to moral courage and serves as light to all who value
truth.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
212 ORWELL, supra note 3, at 217; see generally Duncan, supra note 102, at 5.
213 Solzhenitsyn, supra note 209.
214 See Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL. & ETHICS J.
367, 373 (2010) (noting methods by which government can compel psychological agreement).
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to change citizens' ideological beliefs." 215 These are the petty tyrants and
the authoritarian tactics that Justice Jackson and Justice Kennedy
warned of in Barnette and NIFLA. And the no-compelled-speech doctrine
is a powerful defense against our village tyrants and their dark arts.
The no-compelled-speech doctrine is thus best understood as a
fundamental human right-a legal, political, and moral entitlement-that
protects "sovereignty of the mind" 216 and individual autonomy over
"the few cubic centimeters inside your skull" 21 7 from attempts by
government to promote orthodoxy by compelling speech on matters
of public concern. 218 Moreover, the doctrine recognizes that speech
compelled by government is almost always content-based, or even worse,
viewpoint-based. 21 9 This is even the case when a general, facially-neutral
law prohibiting some form of conduct is applied to regulate speakers or
artists. In other words, when government applies a law to compel a
speaker to speak or create a particular message, as in Hurley, the
restriction compels the content or viewpoint expressed by that particular
220
message.
Perhaps the best dramatic example of authoritarian government and
compelled speech is found in Robert Bolt's wonderful play about Sir
Thomas More, A Man For All Seasons.221 In the play, King Henry has
commanded Thomas More to sign a statement effectively blessing the
King's divorce and remarriage. 222 As a faithful Catholic, More cannot
sign.223 His conscience requires silence. 224 In this remarkable excerpt from
the play, two of the King's officials, Thomas Cromwell and Richard Rich,
discuss the King's motives for refusing to allow More to keep his silence:

215

Id.

216Horwitz, supra note 53, at 727. Professor Horwitz describes Justice Jackson's
opinion in Barnette as recognizing "a kind of paean to the sovereignty of the mind-in a legal
sense, a political sense, and perhaps a larger sense altogether." Id.
217 ORWELL, supra note 3, at 27.
218 Horwitz, supra note 53, at 727.
219 A content-based law would be one that compels an individual to say whatever he
wishes about a particular subject, for example, on the subject of abortion. A viewpoint-based
law would be one that compels an individual to express a particular viewpoint on a subject,
for example to express a view in favor of abortion as in NIFLA. See supra notes 177-178 and
accompanying text. It should be obvious that most instances of compelled speech are
viewpoint-based.
220 See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
221

ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A PLAY IN Two ACTS (1st ed., Vintage Int'l

1990) (1962).
222 Id. at vii-x, xii-xiii.
223 Id. at xiii.
224 Id. at xii, 132-33 (explaining that More could not agree to sign because he would
be going against his conscience; and even if he did sign, his agreement would not make the
king's action right).
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Cromwell The King's a man of conscience and he wants
either Sir Thomas More to bless his marriage or Sir Thomas
More destroyed.
Rich They seem odd alternatives, Secretary.
Cromwell Do they? That's because you're not a man of
conscience. If the King destroys a man, that's proof to the King
that it must have been a bad man, the kind of man a man of
conscience ought to destroy-and of course a bad man's blessing's
225
not worth having. So either will do.
Cromwell's point, of course, captures the essence of authoritarian
government and the importance of the no-compelled-speech doctrine as
understood by Justice Jackson and Justice Kennedy. If the King succeeds
in compelling More's blessing for his divorce and remarriage, he has won
the blessing of a good man, a man whose blessing justifies the King's
conduct. 226 But if More refuses to bless the marriage, he will be treated as
an outlaw, as a bad man whose opinions are worthless. 227 The King wins
either way. And liberty loses either way.
Compelled speech about political and religious beliefs-whether
concerning patriotism and the flag, 228 the relative value of life versus
23 1
0
liberty, 229 gay pride and St. Patrick's day,2 3 the definition of marriage,
or the morality of abortion 232-is always a threat to freedom of thought
and the dignity of individuals who wish to remain silent about certain
subjects or viewpoints.
Looking back on Barnette, Wooley, Masterpiece, and NIFLA, it is
difficult not to admire the courage of the dissenters who risked
their education, their livelihood, and their liberty to defend freedom of
thought, speech, and religious conscience against the tyranny of speech
mandates. Many, but not all, of the compelled speech cases concerned
Jehovah's Witnesses or other religious minorities resisting attempts by
authoritarian officials to impose some notion of official orthodoxy of

225
226
227
228
229
2,0

Id.

at 119 (stage directions omitted).

Id.
Id.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
Wooleyv. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710 (1977).
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 561

(1995).
231

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724

(2018).
232

(2018).

Nat'I Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368
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thought and speech on dissenting citizens. 233 Sarah Berringer Gordon
wrote eloquently concerning Justice Jackson's warning about orthodoxy
leading to the "unanimity of the graveyard" and focused specifically on the
role of religious dissenters in this line of cases: "Religious dissenters, when
seen from this perspective, are like the canary in the coal mine: When they
begin to suffer and die, everyone should be worried that the atmosphere
234
has been polluted by tyranny."
The no-compelled-speech doctrine is designed to nip tyranny and
authoritarianism in the bud when petty and not-so-petty tyrants use law
235
to compel free men and women "to say that which [they] do not think."
From Justice Jackson in Barnette to Justice Kennedy in NIFLA, the Court
has employed the Free Speech Clause as a powerful shield protecting
freedom of thought and speaker autonomy against authoritarian
laws compelling speech. Under the no-compelled-speech doctrine, no
schoolchild, no automobile owner, no parade organizer, no artist, and no
individual may be compelled to say that which they do not think.
We owe a great debt to Justice Jackson, Justice Kennedy, and many
other jurists who have faithfully nurtured this fundamental First
Amendment protection against village tyrants and authoritarian speech
mandates. But the decision in NIFLA was five to four. 236 To paraphrase
Benjamin Franklin, the no-compelled-speech doctrine is a fundamental
First Amendment right only "if we can keep it.237

2,3 E.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629 (Jehovah's Witnesses); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707
(Jehovah's Witnesses); Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (Christian cake artist);
NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. at 2368 (mostly Christian crisis pregnancy centers).
234 Sarah Berringer Gordon, What We Owe Jehovah's Witnesses, AM. HIST., April 2011,
at 41.
235 See supra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
239 NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. at 2367.
237 When Benjamin Franklin was asked by a passerby on the streets of Philadelphia
what kind of government had been established by the Constitutional Convention, he
responded: "A republic, ifyou can keep it." NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP
IT 8 (2019).

